The State of Play. The Sahel region grapples with persistent instability fueled by terrorist networks, fragile governance, and socioeconomic challenges. The recent formation of a confederation among military-led governments - or juntas - in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso adds complexity to external intervention strategies.Why It Matters. Regional instability threatens both African and global security by enabling terrorist groups, migration crises, and certainly economic development. So that, already existing regional instability becomes rather a whole disregarded global instability.The Stakes. Failure to address these challenges risks further entrenchment of terrorist networks, regional spillover effects, and strained international relations, particularly between Morocco and Algeria.Urgent Steps. Immediate coordination between regional powers (we, in the present Intelligence Brief, propose cooperation between Morocco and Algeria) is needed, focusing on military and economic initiatives in order to stabilize the Sahel.The Sahel, a vast region stretching across Africa, has become a hotspot for extremist activities. Groups such as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda; Boko Haram; Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) have intensified attacks, leading to a tragedious rise in fatalities. In the first half of 2024 alone, reported fatalities reached a record-high of 7,620, marking a 9% increase compared to the same period in 2023 and even a staggering 190% increase compared to 2021. (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" class="text-blue-600 hover:text-blue-800 underline" href="https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-12/west-africa-and-the-sahel-13.php">https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2024-12/west-africa-and-the-sahel-13.php</a>)&nbsp;Aside, we can also thoroughly consider the work done regarding this issue by Abdelhak Bassou and Ihssane Guennoun within the OCP Policy Center, newly renamed Policy Center for the New South. Through the said work, we inform ourselves that some terrorist groups (in addition to the said ones) continue to operate independently, disregarding the directives issued by their hierarchical leaders despite their pledged allegiances. (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" class="text-blue-600 hover:text-blue-800 underline" href="https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/OCPPC-PB1701vEn_0.pdf">https://www.policycenter.ma/sites/default/files/OCPPC-PB1701vEn_0.pdf</a>)&nbsp;This further complicates the ‘landwork’ that could be done by military and/or local authorities to secure/control/provide services/assess the area, although we’ll attempt to approach the feasibility of these complications by proposing a cooperation framework between regional actors.The security landscape further evolved with the announcement by Niger's Defence Minister, Salifou Mody, of a joint force comprising 5,000 troops from Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali. This force, known as the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), is allegedly set to deploy in the central Sahel region, equipped with air assets, equipment, and intelligence resources.&nbsp;Following the presented data, hereby a full-picture dashboard that exposes all direct/verifiable/viable data related to the on-going conflicts in the Sahel region, counting stopped at mid-2024. Armed Conflict Location &amp; Event Data (ACLED) (<a target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer nofollow" class="text-blue-600 hover:text-blue-800 underline" href="https://acleddata.com/2024/08/14/the-sahel-mid-year-metrics-2024/">https://acleddata.com/2024/08/14/the-sahel-mid-year-metrics-2024/</a>)In terms of moving actors, we consider here three (3) major layers, the first and most important one being the Morocco and Algeria duo, secondly the international organisations and coalitionsMorocco and Algeria: Both nations are vying for influence in the Sahel. Morocco is emerging as a security partner, putting on the table counterterrorism expertise and investing in infrastructure projects to connect the Sahel to Moroccan ports. Algeria, conversely, leverages its geographic proximity and historical ties, from which it provides military aid and proposes FTZs to strengthen economic relations with Sahelian countries.International Coalitions: The United Nations, African Union (AU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are actively engaged in peacekeeping and conflict mediation efforts. However, resource constraints and the complex political landscape pose challenges to their missions.Terrorist Groups: Extremist organizations exploit state weaknesses and local grievances to establish strongholds in ungoverned areas, which is the core destabilizing strategy used by the said groups in the region.The framework that will be later proposed isn’t without criticism or even risk of deployment. The lack of coordinated strategies among key stakeholders could exacerbate the crisis, leading to a couple of negative outcomes.In such contextes of crisis management, militant groups are expected to further consolidate power, expanding their operations across West Africa. This outcome is assessed by the rally-around-the-flag effect, where efforts for regional stability turns into a direct threat to the terrorist organisations’ existence, consequently making them more engaged/motivated thus having a clearer conflict objective and becoming more violent about it.Furthermore, ongoing instability, coupled with an interventionist framework are likely to drive large-scale displacement, with over 4 million people already forced from their homes in the central Sahel region.Escalating rivalry between Morocco and Algeria could further hinder regional cooperation and unity instead of rallying them around a common objective, which is transforming an ongoing crisis into a stability; socioeconomic; geopolitical beneficial outcome.Consequently, failure to effectively address the crisis undermines global confidence in collective security mechanisms.In order to approach this issue, we now propose cost estimations for conflict resolution and development, which are often (and must be) guided by frameworks such as Collier and Hoeffler’s Conflict Trap Model and the Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management (CACM):<ol><li>Conflict Trap Model: Collier and Hoeffler (2004) emphasize that post-conflict interventions must tackle both immediate recovery needs (security and humanitarian aid) and long-term growth (infrastructure and institution-building). Applying the found theoretical results to the Sahel suggests a dual-layered investment strategy.</li><li>Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management (CACM): This other approach integrates security, development, and governance under one-above-all framework. It argues that siloed strategies fail to address interconnected root causes, which include poverty, exclusion, and weak institutions (European Union External Action, 2018).</li></ol>So, the implementation protocol, subjectively, should include a three-layered framework being implemented, simultaneously, to the actors cited above (Morocco &amp; Algeria duo, International Coalitions and Terrorist Groups).First thing first, any military intervention in the Sahel would necessitate a regional coalition comprising Morocco, Algeria, and the Mali-Burkina-Niger forces to dismantle terrorist networks and, subsequently, restore security. The projected annual cost for this initiative stands at approximately $2.5 billion, which is chosen because of being based on average expenditures for UN peacekeeping missions, including troop deployment, logistics, operational support etc. Central to this strategy would be joint border security operations as well as the establishment of intelligence-sharing frameworks among regional powers. Such efforts aim to weaken insurgent activity. Nonetheless, the intervention is fraught with risks including the region's challenging terrain and, relatedly, the adaptability of insurgent groups. Risks aside, a potential criticism that could be raised here is also the recent retrieval of French operation Barkhane, marking failure to instill desired stability. In order to approach this shadowpoint, we suggest that: Although France, a strongly-rooted prior colonial power, having accurate knowledge of African geographical/geopolitical/domestic landscape; it is still advisable to rely on African-sovereign forces in order to stabilise the Sahelian scattered conflicts.Complementing military efforts, a socioeconomic development agenda is indispensable for addressing extremism. This would require an estimated annual investment of $1.8 billion, based on World Bank data on development programs tailored to fragile states. Priorities would include (1) opening then expanding access to education in remote and underserved areas, (2) constructing infrastructure to connect marginalized communities, (3) and launching youth employment programs to curtail recruitment into extremist organizations. The anticipated long-term benefits include diminished extremist recruitment and the strengthening of local economies, which will serve as countermeasures to terrorists’ efforts, as expressed, to directly recruit hostile/fragile/targeted individuals. However, these outcomes depend on the sustained availability of resources and close cooperation with local populations to ensure the initiatives’ relevance.Equally vital is the role of diplomatic and regional mediation in fostering a sustainable path to peace and cooperation in the Sahel. This third and last proposed strategy envisions the creation of a Sahel Stability Forum under the leadership of the African Union, with Morocco and Algeria assuming co-chair roles to spearhead peace negotiations. The initiative would thus require an annual investment of $500 million, modeled on the costs of UN-led mediation and diplomatic engagement efforts. The primary goal here is to mitigate geopolitical tensions. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that the success of this approach is contingent upon overcoming entrenched historical rivalries and ensuring the political will of all participating nations: which is exactly the led-point of this Intelligence Brief; creating a potential path of cooperation between the said regional actors in order for them to execute their mandatory duty to protect the Sahel in means of an African-sovereign tailored solution.To conclude, the Sahel dilemma cannot be unpacked with a one-size-fits-all solution. Like braiding strands of rope, military action, development initiatives, and regional diplomacy must intertwine for sustainable results. As a subjective view, Morocco and Algeria, as a joint force, must and without any doubt bury the hatchet and lead from the front, while international partners bring expertise and/or resources to the table. The clock is ticking, and only through unity can this Sahelian tinderbox be prevented from going up in flames.

The Sahel faces mounting instability fueled by extremist violence, weak governance, and economic hardship. In response, military regimes in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have formed a joint force to tackle security threats. Despite deep-rooted tensions, there is growing interest in exploring regional cooperation. Morocco and Algeria, if aligned, could play a pivotal role in stabilizing the region and countering long-term threats.

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Yacine Najimi

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A New Dawn: Morocco-Algeria Alliance for the Sahel